| The end of Saddam Hussein's regime has
allowed both sides to scale back their security relationship to where it
had been in 1990, before the first Gulf War. Back then, the U.S. had maintained
a close military relationship, in terms of training, arms supply and so
on, that stretched back decades without causing the sort of domestic political
problems that have accompanied the stationing of U.S. troops inside the
kingdom since Operation Desert Shield. Now they can revert to that relationship,
because the demise of Saddam means the official reason for the U.S. troop
presence no longer exists.
Operation Iraqi Freedom had brought an
additional 20-25,000 U.S. troops into Saudi over the past few months, and
those are obviously no longer needed. Also, the changed landscape of the
region means that a facility of the scale of Prince Sultan airbase, from
which it was possible to direct thousands of simultaneous air operations,
is no longer required. The duplicate facility built in Qatar for the current
conflict, which is more state-of-the-art and also more portable, is more
than adequate for the new situation.
Saddam's ouster has also significantly
increased the U.S. strategic presence in the region, raising questions
about what sort of military facilities the Americans will ask for or get
from a new Iraqi government. But recent war also showed that you didn't
need a major commitment from Saudi Arabia to achieve U.S. military goals
in the region — the Gulf States and U.S. aircraft carriers were able to
stage much of the air war, because the Saudis didn't want the U.S. to fly
direct combat missions against Iraq from their territory. Still, the relationship
worked pretty well during the war. The Saudis did allow air missions, refueling,
the staging of Special Forces and other operations — the U.S. got the minimum
of what it asked for.
TIME.com: Even though the Saudis mooted
the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal some time ago, some may be inclined to
see the withdrawal as some form of punishment for the Saudis for not wholeheartedly
supporting the U.S. war effort?
MacLeod: Some politicians in Washington
may be inclined to cast this decision as a slap in the face to the Saudis,
but I see no sign that at the highest level of the U.S. government that
Saudi Arabia is being abandoned as a strategic ally. The fundamentals of
that relationship — which long predated the deployment of U.S. troops there
and are based on Saudi Arabia's oil production, its geographic location
and its longstanding friendship with the U.S. — remain unchanged. Even
in the best-case scenario in Iraq, it take a very long time before the
government and people of Iraq are as closely aligned with the U.S. as the
Saudis are.
TIME.com: How will the announcement be
received inside Saudi Arabia?
MacLeod: Some in the Saudi leadership will
welcome the news, because they have been upset by what they see as the
U.S. acting as if it owned Saudi Arabia. There's a lot of nationalism in
the royal family, not to mention on the streets. And those elements will
be happy to see U.S. troops withdrawn, and won't see any downside. But
there will be others in the leadership who will worry about the reality,
or the perception, that the withdrawal downgrades Saudi Arabia's strategic
importance to the U.S. The Saudis believe they need to be under a U.S.
security umbrella. And some may be concerned that this withdrawal creates
the impression among internal Saudi opposition forces, and also Iran, that
Saudi Arabia's importance to the U.S. has diminished, and this may encourage
them to mount new challenges to Saudi regime.
TIME.com: Ironically, the U.S. military
presence in Saudi Arabia has long been one of the primary grievances of
Osama bin Laden and his organization. How will the withdrawal play for
bin Laden and his supporters?
MacLeod: Well, remember, for bin Laden,
it wasn't simply a question of the U.S. troops; it was the idea that the
presence of those troops showed just how subservient the royal family had
become to the U.S. The extremists perceive the Saudi regime as agents of
the U.S. and that perception won't change with the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
The Saudis won't hide their continued agreements and cooperation with the
U.S. and the hard-line fundamentalists will continue to see Americans as
dominating Saudi affairs. It may even be worse, because there are now some
250,000 U.S. troops just over the border in Iraq, a bigger footprint than
ever, and it was put there with a degree of cooperation from the Saudis.
TIME.com: Will the U.S. withdrawal help
or hinder the quest for domestic political reform in Saudi Arabia?
MacLeod: Some Saudis will be very concerned
about the message this sends about the strength of their regime. After
all, the strength and visibility of that relationship reinforced an aura
of invincibility at home. That may have been important for the regime,
but it may also have been a liability. Ordinary Saudis, not only fundamentalists,
feel their government has been too subservient to the U.S. So this may
actually work in favor of those pushing for internal reform, because the
U.S. presence had soured many on the royal family. Now that the Americans
are getting out and the relationship will be recast as one of mutual respect,
it will help government reformists focus on domestic issues related to
Saudi Arabia's development.
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